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Abstract: 
How does global aging affect the convergence in global economic development? Both the developing and 
developed world will be characterized for the coming decades by aging populations. Changes in the age 
distribution of a population are an important determinant of economic performance as they affect wealth 
accumulation and dependency burdens, yielding a demographic dividend of extra growth.  During the twenty 
years from 1975 to 2005 Europe and the US have benefited from a strong demographic dividend. However, in 
the decades to come this effect will be reversed and the driving force behind the wealth of nations has to be 
sought elsewhere. Africa and, to some extent, India might benefit from the demographic dividend. However, this 
potential growth phase may well disappear if supporting conditions for growth are absent. Large-scale migration 
is not expected to be a sustainable solution to unbalanced global economic developments. Remittances, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) will remain necessary capital flows for the 
developing world in the near future. Remittances offer no structural solution to reduction of poverty as these 
funds flow to a selective group of families and are allocated generally to consumption rather than to investment 
purposes. Migration of a temporary nature in conjunction with offshore outsourcing of services and production 
may offer a solution for the dilemmas of population and development, which OECD donors face in offering 
development assistance and designing immigration policy. 
 
* This paper builds on and extends an unpublished essay written as part of the Walter Line Initiative of the 
European Parliament, financed with financial support of the European Commission.  Comments on earlier 
versions of the paper by Nico van Nimwegen, Frans Willekens, Jörgen Mortensen are gratefully acknowledged. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the nexus between population and development is almost like the quest for the 
Holy Grail for both academic scholars and policy makers. In highly developed countries, the 
aging of populations puts welfare states to the test since many social security and pension 
arrangements are built on assumptions of fixed age distributions in schooling, work and 
retirement; assumptions that run counter to practice. Politicians are facing the challenge to 
reform or build welfare states that are both ‘aging’-proof and that offer the incentives to 
increase productivity and welfare of current and future generations. On the other side of the 
globe – in the less developed countries - the high rates of fertility, the relatively rapid increase 
in life expectancy, together with the threat of an AIDS-pandemic offer the biggest challenges. 
High rates of fertility could threaten sustainable development. The AIDS-pandemic is in itself 
a human tragedy but which constitutes also a catastrophe that destroys human capital, capital 
that is essential for developing countries to escape from the poverty trap and which brings 
fertility rates in line with preferred rates (Ross et al., 2005). 
Many western countries are aware that demographic developments both at home and 
in neighboring countries or regions have become of major importance for the welfare of 
citizens. Therefore, a global view on demographic developments is slowly replacing the more 
common autarky view on demographic developments. The presence of communicable 
diseases, the large-scale legal and illegal migration flows, the changing division of labor in 
the world all make one wary of the fact that views of ‘splendid isolation’ will not suffice and 
in this particular sense the world has become a ‘smaller place’. This process has been 
stimulated by the internationalization and integration of markets for goods, labor, capital and 
ideas and the increasing recognition of the importance of global public goods (see Kaul et al., 
2003). Amidst these developments the task of disentangling the consequences of demographic 
transitions and aging processes and their impact on policy remains a difficult task because 
unambiguous and universal conclusions how economy and demography interact are hard to 
reach at this point. 
This paper offers a perspective on the issues of global aging and convergence of 
development by first presenting some relevant stylized facts and forecasts of population 
growth and aging up to 2050 around the world (section 2). The predictions made rely heavily 
on those made by the UN (2004), not because they offer superior predictions, but primarily 
because the UN projections are the focal point in discussing demographic futures worldwide 
and as Demeny (2004, p. 513) stresses – albeit with respect to the UN long-range projections 
– they offer its users “a way to think about coming demographic developments: a frame of 
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reference that users must fill with substance.” The substance offered focuses on three 
pertinent issues: (1) do global developments in fertility and mortality lead to a convergence or 
divergence of economic development? (in section 3); (2) how does migration affect the 
process of convergence? (Section 4); and (3) what role is there for population and 
development assistance amidst other international capital flows and international trade in 
goods and services? (Section 5). Section 6 concludes this paper with a summary and 
perspective discussing the likelihood of a demographically divided world.  
  
2. Stylized Facts of Global Aging and Convergence 
During the course of the latter half of the twentieth century two salient features have 
determined global demographic developments: the increase in life expectancy and the sharp 
drop in fertility. 
 
Mortality 
To start with the first stylized fact of demographic change, the increase in life expectancy has 
occurred both developing and developed parts of the world. The most notable element of this 
development is the pronounced reduction in the gap between the most developed and the less 
developed countries. For instance, male life expectancy at birth for the period 1950-2000 
increased by seven years in the more developed countries and a staggering twenty years in the 
less developed countries. What lies behind this strong catch up in increased life expectancy in 
developing countries is the improvement of reproductive health, thereby lowering the infant 
mortality rate and the mortality rate of women who gave birth to a child. This development in 
life expectancy is in marked contrast with the developed world where the increased life 
expectancy is primarily concentrated at the end of the human life span (see Lee and 
Tuljapurkar, 1997). For an understanding of economic and social consequences this stylized 
fact is important as the developing world has added years during the most productive stage of 
the human life course whereas in the developed world the added years were predominantly to 
be found in the retirement stage. 
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
 
For the next fifty years life expectancy gains are predicted to be relatively small (see Figure 
1), but again the less developed world is expected to catch up with the more developed world 
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and in that respect population aging will not be a typical Western phenomenon but will occur 
in both developing and developed countries. 
 
Fertility 
The perspective of an aging world will be even more pronounced if we take a look at fertility 
developments over the past years and cast an eye to the decades to come. Fertility started to 
drop sharply around 1970 (see Figure 2) in both more developed and less developed countries 
but with a sharper drop in the latter group, presumably attributable to a wider knowledge and 
distribution of contraceptive means. The only exception to this rule is Africa, a continent that 
is expected to maintain a level of fertility above the level compatible with a stable population. 
As shown in Figure 2, fertility in Africa although converging towards that of other regions in 
the world, is projected nevertheless to remain at some 2.5 even in 2050 while in Asia, the 
Americas and Europe fertility is projected to converge towards 1.9, corresponding to a falling 
population in the long run (assuming a gradual leveling off of life expectancy). There are, 
however, provisos which could shed a different light on this long term convergence process. 
These forecasts depend to a large extent on how fertility preferences and control develop. 
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
To explore the latter force one can be both pessimistic and optimistic about fertility control 
results attained. Substantial progress has been achieved in satisfying the demand for modern 
contraceptive use (male and female sterilization, IUD, pill and condom) in developing 
countries. The demand for contraceptives, as presented in Table 1 is defined as the sum of 
actual use of contraceptives and the unmet need1 for them and to gain an impression of the 
level of satisfied demand the actual use is simply devided by the demand, for five wealth 
classes. The general impression is that the poorest persons have the least part of their demand 
satisfied by contraceptive use, but over time each quintile and each region has shown 
improvement. Africa, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa remains, however, a region of 
demographic risk in many respects. In this respect one can see why Cleland and Sinding 
(2005) stress the need for further support for family planning programs in Sub-Saharan 
                                                          
1 The common definition of unmet need used in Demographic Health Surveys is: Women with unmet need are 
those who are married/cohabiting, fecund, not using a method, and wish to postpone birth at least two years. 
Women who are pregnant or amenorrheic have unmet need if they did not want the current pregnancy or recent 
birth either at that time or at all, but if a contraceptive failure was responsible the woman is treated as having no 
unmet need. 
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Africa. The issue of the economic consequences of high fertility rates and unmet need seems 
to have been swamped by the attention and financial support directed at the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, whereas common sense dictates that reproductive health care and prevention of 
HIV/AIDS go hand in hand. 
Fertility preferences are not fixed and contraceptive technology is not the only driving 
force behind fertility developments. As Bongaarts (2003) shows, based on a set of 
demographic health surveys, the level of education matters considerably in attaining levels of 
fertility. This finding is corroborated by regression results with the World Values Survey in 
Table 2, explaining the number of children raised by married or ever married women. Age 
group differences exist, which could signify that fact that preferences of cohorts differ as well 
as the fact that timing of births may have been shifted to later periods in life. The most 
important effects are to be traced in the strong educational effects, especially in non-OECD 
countries and the candidate countries of the EU (notably Turkey), the weak income effects 
and the non-negligible effects which religion exerts in affecting fertility levels. Especially in 
Western countries the secularization of everyday life seems to have had a profound influence 
on fertility developments. The relatively small effect of religion in countries outside the 
OECD is perhaps also a telling sign that fertility preferences are hard wired and changing 
fertility preferences is a long-term issue. 
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
The strong educational effects can have far-reaching consequences. If the educational 
composition of developing countries does not change the demographic transition as depicted 
in Figure 2 in developing countries may come to a halt and so will economic convergence.  
 
HERE FIGURE 2 
 
Aggregate demographic consequences 
Despite a decline during the last decade or so (partly due to the AIDS epidemic) life 
expectancy in Africa is projected by the UN to resume its rise during the coming decades. In 
response to both a maintained high level of fertility and some improvement in life expectancy, 
the Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is projected to substantially increase its share in the 
world population, from about 12.5 percent in 2000, to 17 per cent in 2025 and to 23 per cent 
in 2050. In other words, while in 1950 only eight persons out of one hundred were living in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa, almost a quarter of the world’s population will, according to the UN’s 
projections, live in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of high (albeit declining) fertility, Sub-
Saharan Africa will account for an even larger share of the world’s population of children and 
youngsters: in the age groups 0-14 and 15-24 almost 30 percent of the world population is 
expected to live in Sub-Saharan Africa and this is also expected to be the case for the age 
group 25-64 whose share will be catching up with the share of the younger age groups, mainly 
due to the gradual stagnation of the number of persons in the active age groups in the rest of 
the world. 
 
HERE TABLE 3 
 
For the world as a whole, the most striking feature of future population trends will be the 
stagnation of the number of young people in the world coupled with a continued rise in the 
people in working age and, notably, the number of elderly (see Table 3). Thus, the number of 
children (0-14 years old) which rose by more than 600 million between 1950 and 1975 (the 
baby boom) and by 330 million from 1975 to 2000, is projected to rise by only some 80 
million between 2000 and 2025 and then to actually decline by close to 80 million over the 
following twenty-five years. The latter development is a remarkable evolution in demographic 
history.  As a consequence of this event the total number of children in the world in 2050 is 
expected to be practically the same as in the year 2000: approximately 1.8 billion. 
 
3. Demography, Economic Growth and Convergence 
How do these two dominant trends – a decline in fertility and an increase in life expectancy - 
affect the world economy? The views concerning the effect of population growth and the age 
distribution of the population on economic growth vary over a large spectrum of economic 
theory and empirical analysis.  It is often argued that the rapid population growth has a 
negative effect on economic growth, but compelling evidence on this point has been rather 
elusive and subject to an abundance of counterarguments. Since the early 1980s the dominant 
view has been that population growth neither systematically impedes nor promotes economic 
growth. More recently, however, evidence has emerged suggesting that changes in the age 
distribution of a population may be an important determinant of economic performance 
(Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Lee et al., 2003). In particular, the pattern of saving and 
consumption may vary over the life cycle and it is the relative size of young, working-age and 
retired persons which determine aggregate saving and consumption of a population. 
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Demographic transitions can affect economic growth by various phases. The age 
distribution effect of a decline in fertility (frequently termed ‘the second demographic 
transition’) will operate first to lower, then to raise, then to lower again the ratio of the 
economically active population to the total population. The first effect is called the ‘burden’ 
phase of a typical demographic transition, whereas the ‘gift’ phase represents the phase 
covering the interval during which dependency ratio is lower than the new stationary state. 
The latter effect is better known the ‘demographic dividend’. Given that the age distribution is 
determined by fluctuations in fertility, mortality and migration it may consequently be 
desirable to take account of these factors in an analysis of the effects on economic growth of 
demographic change. In a more recent study using data for a panel of countries Bloom and 
Canning (2004) find growth of working-age to total population to have a positive sign and in 
fact being close to one. They consider this effect to be essentially equivalent to a supply-side 
boost to the economy. However, Bloom and Canning stress that the condition for this effect to 
materialize is that the economy is in a position to effectively adapt the demand for labor (and 
employment) to the fluctuations in supply. In fact, they find that a completely open economy 
will enjoy nearly twice the growth impact of demographic change as the average country. In 
addition their results indicate that a country with a closed economy will have no gain from 
demographic change. Consequently, “the impact of demographic change may be to increase 
labor supply but how well this extra supply of workers is put to productive employment 
depends on the economic system and policies being used” (Bloom and Canning, 2004, p. 29). 
Needless to say, the age composition of the population is only one of the determinants of 
economic growth. 
If we apply these research findings to the case of Western countries or an industrial 
challenger like China the demographic projections of the potential work force (15-64 years of 
age) for the next fifty years are not too encouraging. In Europe the work force shows a steady 
increase in the work force potential up and till 2010 (see Figure 3), after which the work force 
will steadily decline. 
 
HERE FIGURE 3 
 
The developments in the United States are less pronounced from 2010 to 2050. The most 
volatile developments in work force structure can be found in China, where the work force 
rapidly increased from a low 56 percent of the population to a high point of 73 percent around 
2010. The subsequent fall in relative work force size is just as dramatic as the European fall. 
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From 2010 to 2050 both countries seem to move in tandem, although the Chinese work force 
remains two to three percentage points higher. Consequently, during the twenty years from 
1970 to 2010 these old and new industrialized countries have benefited from a strong 
demographic dividend. As far as East Asia is concerned, the demographic dividend over the 
same period may have been even larger, with the ratio of working-age to dependent 
population rising from 1.4 to 2.5 or by almost 80 percent, corresponding to some two 
percentage points per year. 
However, in the decades to come the benefits of a growing work force will dissipate 
and the demographic dividend will turn into a ‘demographic hangover’. The driving force 
behind the wealth of nations has to be sought elsewhere: notably more capital accumulation, 
more work effort, or more innovation. In their study Bloom and Canning define the working-
age population as the sum of the number of persons in the age groups from 15-64. Whether 
the demographic hangover will materialize depends to a large extent on the ability of 
developed countries, notably in Europe, to compensate the decline in the ratio to working-age 
to total population by increasing the effective retirement age and the employment ratio in 
those age classes. If the past is to offer some guidance in the change in number of working 
years then the increase in life expectancy will trigger an increase in savings, as Bloom et al. 
(2003) show for a cross-country panel data set. In other words, people apparently preferred in 
the recent past to finance an increase in life expectancy by saving extra and certainly not 
working longer. Most European countries have shown a clear bias towards early retirement 
and are in the process of redressing this tendency by restructuring the pension policies and 
increasing personal responsibility in matters of retirement.2 The effect of increased longevity 
will however affect the developed and developing nations not alike. As mentioned earlier, the 
increase in life expectancy in the industrialized countries derives primarily from adding ages 
at the end of the life and is expected to have a negative impact on economic growth. The less 
developed nations which still have (relatively) high infant mortality rates may expect to see an 
increase in life expectancy by adding more youthful years and on that account the longevity 
increase in these countries can offer a stimulus to economic growth (see Boucekkine et al., 
2002). 
According to the United Nations’ demographic projections, both Europe and East Asia 
can be expected to experience a pronounced decline in the ratio of working-age to dependent 
                                                          
2 Of course, there is also the third option to increase technical change or as the ‘accountants of economic growth’ 
call it ‘total factor productivity’, the increase in productivity that cannot be ascribed to increased accumulation of 
production factors, like land, capital and labor. 
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population over the coming decades, from 2.3 to 1.4 for Europe and from 2.5 to 1.5 for East 
Asia. In contrast, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are now expected – alone among the 
large regions of the world – to experience an increase in the ratio of working-age to dependent 
population. In the case of the entire African continent (see Figure 3) the work force started to 
rise around 1990 and that around 2040 Africa is expected to have the highest work force 
potential (measured by the ratio of potential work force to the total population). The purely 
demographic developments provide only a broad indication of the potential developments 
while the actual outcome will undoubtedly result from the interaction of those factors with 
economic and social policy. 
Population growth is not the only driving force of economic growth. Bloom and 
Williamson (1998) showed in a long-term perspective how demographic transition leads to 
speeding up and slowing down of economic growth, but in the end the fundamental driving 
forces underneath the wealth of nations are determined by (human and physical) capital 
accumulation, international trade and technical progress. And on that count, the empirics of 
economic growth do not seem to lead on to think that in the long run economies will 
converge. Sala-i-Martin (1996) shows that the cross-country distribution of global GDP 
between 1960 and 1990 did not shrink, and that poor countries have not grown faster than rich 
countries. The best description of global economy seems to be a process of club convergence: 
within clubs of relatively homogenous countries there is a process of convergence, but 
between the clubs the process is marked by a process of divergence. A similar interpretation 
but with a far longer time horizon is provided by Maddison (2005). Table 4 presents evidence 
that over five hundred years time where most Western continents seem to converge and 
follow a similar growth pattern. Regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and notably 
Africa are structurally lagging behind. 
 
HERE TABLE 4 
 
The lessons of economic growth suggest that diverging demographic developments play some 
role in economic divergence but to understand diverging growth histories more fully 
differences in technological progress, international specialization, capital accumulation and 
social infrastructure have proven to be far more important (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
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4. Migration and Convergence 
The analysis of global aging has left out the third element of demographic accounting: 
migration. Migration is and always has been the most difficult element of population growth 
to predict if not to register the stocks and flows of people moving across country boundaries.  
Furthermore, migration is sometimes presented as the cure-all for aging or declining 
populations. United Nations (2000) counterfactuals of replacement migration on this point are 
a case in point. With respect to showing the forces of aging the counterfactuals serve their 
purpose. However, as realistic policy options the calculations are not very illuminating as they 
offer a mechanical projection exercise and ignore social or economic mechanisms that drive 
migration.  For instance, for the EU as a whole almost a million immigrants per year would be 
required to keep the EU population constant over the period up to 2050. Furthermore, more 
than one and a half million immigrants per year would be required to ensure a constant 
working-age population. The latter figure corresponds to about five times the level of annual 
net immigration assumed in Eurostat’s 2004 baseline projection. Consequently, only an 
unlikely level of immigration could thus fill the demographic gap caused by the aging of the 
EU population. Exercises such as those performed by the UN (2000) are therefore best 
characterized by the term coined by Coleman (2000) “demographism”: solving a problem by 
the internal logic of the demographic accounting framework. Migration is potentially a strong 
force but not for the mechanical reasons of attaining a constant population or age structure. 
Below the current and future state of the migration force will be reviewed. 
 
4.1 Current State of Migration 
Migration could potentially speed up the economic convergence process. In standard 
migration theory people will move to take advantage of wage differences across countries or 
regions. The inflow of people will affect relative returns in destination and source regions and 
hence bring about a convergence of living standards. In theory, mobility of labor can bring 
about the same effect as mobility of capital. The difference is, of course, that whenever people 
move and settle permanently in another country their financial assets will move as well and 
thereby affect the capital-labor ratio in both the country of destination and source. An even 
bigger difference why trade in labour differs markedly from trade in capital or goods is of 
course the fact that people have values and preferences which goods and capital lack. As the 
German writer Max Frisch remarked about the ‘Gastarbeiter’ (i.e. temporary ‘guest’ workers) 
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triggered by strong German labour demand in the 1960s and 1970s: “Wir haben Arbeitskräfte 
gerufen, und es sind Menschen gekommen.”3 
There are three reasons why migration will not have a substantial beneficial effect on 
attaining economic convergence. 
 
1. Immigration restrictions. First of all, migration is not free to move.The welfare costs of 
these restrictions are large, thereby implicitly suggesting how inefficient current restrictive 
immigration policies are. Hamilton and Walley (1984) were the first to show that the effiency 
gains from free migration for the world at large could be gigantic, varying from US$ 4.7 to 
US$ 16 trillion, when world GDP was US$ 7.82 trillion. Moses and Letnes (2005) and Iregui 
(2005) have refined the analysis by paying attention to adjustment and transaction costs, 
which toned down the enormous welfare gains of Hamilton and Walley, but by any standard 
their calculated gains remain enormous. The tacit assumption made in these counterfactual 
studies is that when immigration restrictions are removed migrants will flow to wherever 
there the skill price to human capital is higher. The image of a seamless world in which all 
migrants move from developing countries to developed countries does not ring true and this 
brings us to the second reason why migration is not expected to be a solution to divergence: 
 
2. Home bias in migration. Just like international trade and capital investments are led by a 
strong ‘home bias’, so is the movement of people. With hindsight we have to face the fact that 
most migration occurs close to home and a substantial closing of the income gap is not very 
likely. Migrants are by and large not the globetrotters textbooks lead us to believe. The UN 
reported in 2000 that 175 million people live in a country other than where they were born. Of 
these 175 million migrants some 15 million are refugees, 14 million acquired citizenship of 
their new country of residence and of 8.5 million people their country of origin is unknown. 
For the remaining migrants the OECD has information and this is presented in Table 5. 
Migrants stay mostly within their continent of birth. The only exception to this rule is Latin 
America where the bulk of emigrants (primarily from Mexico and the Caribbean) move to the 
United States. 
 
HERE TABLE 5 
 
                                                          
3 Translation: “We have called for labour and we received people.” 
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3. Labor quality of immigrants. A third reason which has to be kept in mind, is that the quality 
of immigrants in terms of human capital has not been constant over time and developed 
countries in particular Europe and the United States have encountered an increase in unskilled 
immigrants (Hatton and Williamson, 2004). In the recent past the composition of immigrants 
heading towards the United States was primarily European, but due to changing immigration 
policies the composition of immigrants leads to a growing group of people who do not catch 
up in terms of wage income (Borjas, 1999). The conclusion reached by Borjas is not without 
qualifications and Schultz (1998) gives a critical overview where the pitfalls arise in 
interpreting this type of research. Integration in the labor force can be defined in dimensions 
of education, productivity, wage growth, labor force participation or literacy and with each 
dimension the evaluation changes. Perhaps the conclusion of Schultz is worth mentioning as 
he states that “The decrease in average education of the immigrant population entering the 
United States is probably less important than the growing heterogeneity of immigrants, with a 
substantial inflow of immigrants who are both relatively well educated (beyond college) and 
poorly educated (less than high school).” (Schultz, 1998: 249) An extra pitfall may perhaps be 
the fact that most conclusions about the quality of immigration are based on the US 
experience. This may be overturned in the future as gradually the European experience with 
large-scale immigration cristallizes and evidence becomes available as European states 
reluctantly have adapated to the status of immigration country and started collecting data (cf. 
Zimmermann, 2005). Quite a number of European countries (see Boeri et al., 2002) has to 
deal with faltering integration process in which (North) Africans and Asian immigrants 
dominate the policy agenda of most European governments in which not only the economic 
integration seems to matter but also cultural integration. For a long time the process of 
integration seemed to work, but the early immigrants in Western Europe were either 
immigrants from old colonies or immigrants from the Mediterranean side of Europe (Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Italy) who shared the same European values. The current immigration flow 
within Europe triggers anti-immigration sentiments which hinder immigration policy reforms. 
Such sentiments are in line with the labor market position people have: the higher skilled or 
educated are generally pro-immigration in high-income countries, whereas the lower educated 
are more averse to immigration (Mayda, 2004, Chiswick and Hatton, 2002, Van Dalen and 
Henkens 2005). 
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4.2 Future Perspectives on Migration 
Migration flows have mainly been concentrated within the continent of birth (see Table 5). 
The ultimate question for the future is whether this pattern will change. There are three 
reasons to expect that the future will differ: 
 
1. Great expectations. The biggest driving force behind migration is traditionally the size of 
the divergence in skill prices between sending and receiving countries. Hatton and 
Williamson (2003) see parallels in fundamental driving forces between Europe of the 
nineteenth century and Africa today. Especially for Sub-Saharan Africa the effects are strong 
because of the poor economic conditions of the countries in question. Hatton and Williamson 
(2003) note a striking resemblance: earlier estimates for European countries before World 
War I showed that a rise in the foreign to home wage ratio by 10 percent raised gross 
European emigration in the late nineteenth century by 0.7 per thousand in the short run and 
1.3 per thousand in the long run. For a set of African countries a similar increase of 10 percent 
would lead to an out-migration of nearly 1 per thousand. Although African international 
migration is mostly within low-wage Africa rather than from Africa to the high waged 
developed world they acknowledge the possibility that the demographic and economic 
pressure will mount leading more and more to intercontinental emigration.  The same 
phenomenon is acknowledged by Van Dalen, Groenewold and Schoorl (2005) who use 
emigration survey data to see how large emigration intentions are and what drives these 
intentions. Emigration intentions are high, oriented towards countries outside Africa, and the 
most important driving force is the expectation of economic improvement. The only way in 
which this force can be offset is by catching up. According to Hatton and Williamson (2002, 
p. 560) emigration follows a life-cyle: as industrial and demographic revolutions take place 
emigration often rises to a peak before declining. The main driving force behind this life cycle 
is the wage rate and the easing of the poverty constraint: as real wages increase from a low 
level at home, emigration rises; but with further wage growth the poverty constraint is no 
longer of prime importance and the catching up between source and destination begins to 
cause emigration to decline. 
 
2. Age composition in sending countries. A second important driving force in triggering 
emigration is the age structure of a population. It is well known from migration research that 
emigration from developing countries is mainly initiated by young man, primarily single. The 
prospect of a growing and young population puts extra pressure on the level of emigration as 
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they are the more eligible candidates for moving abroad. This prospect of the demographic 
future is reflected in the projections which show that the age structure of the potential sending 
countries will remain significantly younger than that of the developed world, which ages quite 
strongly. If we restrict our attention to developed countries (like the Western Europe and the 
United States) vis-a-vis less developed and least developed countries, as depicted in Figure 4, 
in some countries the gap remains constant and in others it widens.  
 
HERE FIGURE 4 
 
The median age in the more developed countries rises by more than 16 years: from 29 in 1950 
to 45.5 in 2050. The pattern is less steep in Western Europe but given the high intitial median 
age it is still noteworthy, rising from 34.6 to 46.6 years. The median age in less developed 
countries is, of course, lower due to factors discussed in the previous sections, but the most 
significant fact to observe is that the gap stays more or less constant and even decreases 
somewhat at the end of the observation period, when the aging process levels off in the 
developed world. The most notable candidate region as a region of emigrants is Africa 
(Helliwell, 2003). The age structure of the African population will be ‘young’ for decades to 
come. Hatton and Williamson (2003) predict that an increase of the share of the young by 5 
percentage points increases net emigration by 1.3 per thousand. 
 
3. Lower transaction costs. Finally, the fact that transaction costs tied to moving abroad are 
far lower today than they were a century ago constitutes a sound reason to expect that the 
character of migration to differ (Chiswick and Hatton, 2002). Moving across state boundaries 
not only costs less, staying in contact with the country of origin with family and friends is 
easier through internet and other telecommunication technologies. Existing networks of 
migrants will also enable migrants to move internationally as the costs of gathering 
information on a country of destination, settling and finding work will be lower when family 
and friends are already there. It is well-known acknowleged in both theory and empirics how 
migrant networks exert a strong influence on international migration flows. There is however, 
a substantial side-effect because such networks can also lead migrants to choose a destination 
without considering the fact that the country of destination may be ill-suited for their 
capabilities or values. Furthermore, badly integrated networks may make migrants vulnerable 
to labor market shocks as they often find work through their own limited network.  
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Implications for the future 
The pressure to emigrate from developing countries, in particular Africa, is already real and 
will be hard to redress. Migration flows have a life cycle of their own and only if the source 
country catches up with the regions of destination can one hope for stable and low migration 
flows (Hatton and Williamson (2002a). Hatton and Williamson (2002b) make the following 
telling statement in a review of the migration forces in our world of today: “if OECD 
countries think they have an immigration problem now, they are going to find the future even 
more challenging.”  The question is, of course, whether the prime forces that trigger 
emigration today might also diminish this pressure in the near future. Immigration countries – 
both the traditional immigration countries like the United States and Australia, but also 
countries in Europe – are grappling with the consequences of immigration and a slower pace 
of immigration would seem more desirable as the institutions and citizens in most of these 
countries can adjust to accommodate the inflow of immigrants. As far as one can rely on 
intentions as predictors of future behavior, the estimation results in Van Dalen et al. (2005) 
suggest that the emigration pressure will not subside for a considerable time. First of all, it 
takes time for economic prospects in these African countries to improve and once they have 
improved closing the gap between African and Western standards of living will prove to be a 
difficult transition. And secondly, we know from actual migration experience that the 
transnational networks turn out to have an important effect on emigration decisions. In short, 
it is these forces - great expectations about economic gains, poverty, and a relatively young 
age structure - that will stimulate emigration out of Africa for years if not decades to come, 
whereas the most important countervailing force (strong catching up processes in the African 
economies) lacks credibility and will probably not affect the expectations of populations in a 
significant manner for years to come. 
Of course, there are uncertainties and gaps in knowledge about the consequences of 
migration which need to be explored more in full before firm policy conclusions can be 
reached. Knowledge of the benefits and losses of the brain drain is imperfect and this state of 
affairs is perhaps obvious because the gains and losses of migration of skilled people will 
depend on the initial conditions of both the source and destination country and the size of the 
migration flow. Beine et al. (2003) show that a brain drain can have negative growth effects 
in countries where the migration rate is substantial and/or the proportion of higher educated is 
above 5 percent. By contrast, countries with low level of highly skilled and low migration 
rates benefit from a brain drain. In short, size and structure matters, and when shocks in stocks 
are too large it puts the resilience of an economy at stake, but doesn’t this apply to any 
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system? On a more principle level, a brain drain should not be condemned for, as Stark (2004) 
argues, “migration is conducive to the formation of human capital” (p. 16). Closing borders is 
bound to weaken incentives to invest in specialized human capital, either because of the 
classical argument that the division of labor is restricted by the extent of the market or 
because in some cases the production of knowledge is essentially the production of a global 
good and restricting the inflow of scientific personel is detrimental to the production of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
5. Investing in Population and Development 
Considering the divergence in population and economic development across the world it is 
hard to believe that this divergence can be resolved by means of flows of migrants from the 
South settling permanent in the North. The logical alternative for labor flows between regions 
is capital flows and open trade regimes. Only by investment in human capital, physical capital 
and social infrastructure, complemented with the removement of trade barriers can one hope 
for a convergence of economic development. It is often tacitly assumed that once economic 
development takes off population growth will automatically slow down. Economic growth is, 
in short, the best contraceptive around. Of course, the relationship between population and 
development nexus is far more intricate than this simple statement (and at times based on 
equally simple correlations) would suggest. The causality could go either way and this has 
troubled and divided policy makers and advisers in the past decades (Merrick, 2002). The 
economic growth rate as such is a bad indicator of what is going on in a country, just like 
population growth is an indicator, which sums up various underlying demographic 
developments. The dynamics of the age structure of a population are far more important as the 
literature on the demographic dividend suggests (see section 2). But in order for growth to 
take off more seems to be needed: suitable policies and governance structures that deal with 
not only with private investment but also with an appropriate health and educational policies, 
gender inequality and the disruptive effects of ethnic and religious diversity. The realization 
that these issues matter in constructing policy sheds new light on ineffective policy designs of 
the past. 
With respect to global demographic developments numerous population conferences 
have been held to diminish rapid population growth and demographic divergence. The early 
population conferences in Rome (1954), Belgrade (1965), Bucharest (1974) and Mexico 
(1984) were very much inspired by the looming population explosion. To put it bluntly, the 
past can be characterized by two subsequent trains of thought: first – during the 1960s and 
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1970s - the Malthusian idea that high fertility causes poverty and lowering fertility (by means 
of family planning programs) is the key to spreading wealth. Second – during the 1980s up to 
the Cairo conference - the idea that poverty causes high fertility and by stimulating growth 
and reduction of poverty one will also see a slowdown in population growth by means of a 
fertility reduction. Fertility decisions were a private decision and hence so was contraception 
viewed as a private good. Current debates on foreign assistance in population and economic 
development are more complex than ever as realization has set in that both markets and 
governments can fail and that issues of gender and religion, which were assumed away in 
models of development, do play a role in population issues. Provision of contraception or 
affordable HIV/AIDS treatment are sometimes simply lacking, thereby impairing private 
choices. And the failure on the side of the government seems to be concentrated in terms of 
poor governance systems and provision of health care insurance and health care facilities. 
Furthermore, disappointing development experiences have served as a wake-up call that 
development aid is no longer an affair which can be dealt with on a bilateral scale, but which 
apparently entails a coordinated global perspective. However, coordination of collective 
action is also hindered by the counterproductive behavioral responses to such well-intentioned 
efforts: countries may save less and invest less prudently in the case they are assured of 
foreign assistance. The continuous reflection on the efficiency of multilateral organizations is 
in that respect a tell-tale sign how difficult the organization of development assistance 
actually is. 
In case of population assistance the same themes resound. The agenda of the 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), signed by 179 
governments in 1994 in Cairo was such an initiative and the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDG) designed in 2000 represent more recent initiatives on a global scale. At present 
population assistance programs are dominated by US donor contributions allocated to 
HIV/AIDS projects and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to 
combat HIV/AIDS has led to a strong upsurge in donor funds in recent years (see Figure 5).4 
With respect to foreign aid, and population assistance programs as envisioned in the Cairo 
Program of Action, there are two issues which will be the focus of attention in the coming 
decades in relation to global aging and population growth: (1) The provision of global public 
                                                          
4 The steep increase in the years around the year 1994 is the result of an expanding definition of population 
assistance: at the ICPD in Cairo it was decided to include reproductive health programs. 
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goods and the rationale of foreign aid; (2) the power of remittances and other private capital 
flows in bringing about economic convergence. 
 
HERE FIGURE 5 
 
5.1 Designing Global Public Goods and Foreign Aid 
At the most fundamental level of analyzing foreign aid, one has to address the question of the 
optimal allocation of donor funds. In the past foreign aid was seen as a moral obligation of the 
West towards the developing world. Foreign aid stems from a solidarity or altruistic motive. 
Over time observers with a more analytical point of view have stressed the fact that in a 
globalizing world human action creates cross-border externalities. As Jayaraman and Kanbur 
(1999: 419) point out “[This view] rests much more on the direct spillovers of the lack of 
development in poor countries on to the well-being of rich countries.” These externalities or 
spillover effects are most visible in questions of environment and global warming, population, 
migration and refugees, defense spending, terrorism, drugs and crime and communicable 
diseases like HIV/AIDS. In particular the HIV/AIDS epidemic brings policy dilemmas to the 
fore which were largely absent in debates about foreign aid. The toll of the disease is high and 
is expected to remain so, despite projected reductions in prevalence. Given the ongoing efforts 
to find treatments the UN World Population Prospects (2004a) assume a longer average 
survivorship for people living with HIV than in previous revisions and therefore somewhat 
lower future mortality levels in HIV-affected countries. 
The reason why one has to focus on transfers (such as conventional foreign aid flows) 
in conjunction with global externalities is that the presence of global externalities implies a set 
of implicit transfers, which may well replace or neutralize the explicit transfers of donor 
countries. This is an important insight from the literature on global collective action (Sandler, 
2004). To do good for the developing world, e.g. combating global warming, may well imply 
to start corrective actions in the developed world instead of transferring income to the 
developing world for taking actions there (Schelling, 1998). In a world where global public 
goods are important it matters whether the public good is pure or imperfect, what type of 
technology is used to produce the public good in question, and which country is most efficient 
in providing the good. Take the case of HIV/AIDS. The development of an effective vaccine 
and the fundamental research how HIV/AIDS develops is a ‘best-shot technology’: resources 
are best accumulated at the point where discovery is likely to occur with the maximum of 
input. Development of medicine in the US and Europe is best explained by this characteristic. 
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However, discovery of a cure for HIV/AIDS also meets the practical side. When a cure has to 
be implemented the implementation technology is probably a ‘weakest link technology’: only 
the smallest provision level determines the public good level. In other words, the level of 
immunization of the recipient country will determine the global level of infection. The focus 
of development policy should thus be on improving the recipient’s capacity and willingness to 
implement HIV/AIDS programs. Parallel issues arise in the case of family planning, which 
comprises a mixture of the research technology of designing better and cost-effective 
contraceptives (best-shot technology) together with the practical side of implementing such 
‘technologies’ (weakest link technology). Investments in human capital may prove to be a 
double-edged sword as education not only increases the productivity of people, but it also 
increases receptivity for reproductive health programs and a convergence to fertility levels 
that potentially offer a more sustainable economy. 
 
Balanced foreign aid allocation 
The previous discussion revolved around the organization of global collective action. Another 
issue pertinent to the achievement of the Cairo goals is the allocation of foreign aid to the 
various elements of the ‘population package’ made explicit in the so-called Program of 
Action. At the start of the program family planning and reproductive health seemed to the 
primary object of attention. But as time progressed the attention switched to the HIV/AIDS 
and currently more than 80 percent of the donor funds is allocated to this goal (see Table 6). 
In 1996 14 percent of the earmarked funds were allocated to HIV/AIDS, and in 2002 this 
percentage was 61 percent and projections made by NIDI suggest that for the year 2007 85 
percent of funds go to HIV/AIDS. 
 
HERE TABLE 6 
 
However, as Cleland and Sinding (2005) argue such an allocation is unbalanced as family 
planning, reproductive health and prevention of HIV/AIDS go hand in hand. Insiders of the 
family planning movement fear that this is all due to the way the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) have been explicated (Blanc and Tsui, 2005). Family planning and reproductive 
health care are treated implicitly, whereas the AIDS pandemic receives ample and explicit 
attention. Within the world of development aid it is clear how things work at the bureaucratic 
level: “If you’re not an MDG, you’re not on the agenda. If you’re not a line item, you’re out 
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of the game,” according to Sinding (in Crossette, 2005, p. 77). The deeper reason may well be 
that religious values still play a large role in allocating money (van Dalen, 2007). 
What’s worse is that the recent unprecedented rise of HIV/AIDS funds is disrupting 
fiscal policy and local health care systems, whereas a more balanced investment in 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS would make use of the existing infrastructure. The new 
HIV/AIDS funds are swamping public health budgets, in some cases exceeding 150 percent 
of the government’s total allocation to health care (Lewis, 2005). Too much money must be 
spent in too short a time. Such a situation, particularly in conditions of extreme poverty and 
poor governance prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, easily results in ‘poaching’ of health care 
workers and bureaucrats from other worthy public projects. In short, when public governance 
systems are weak, these large, but volatile sums of ‘easy money’ promote moral hazard in 
delivering health care (World Bank, 2004b).  
 
5.2 Will Foreign Capital Bring About Convergence? 
To stop the pressure to emigrate and to alleviate poverty it is of prime importance to design 
robust public insurance and health systems in developing countries. Catching up with the 
industralized world would therefore seem like a minimal condition and and influx of private 
and public capital would make it possible to escape the poverty trap which keeps the least 
developed countries stuck at low levels of income. The developing countries receive foreign 
capital flows from a number of sources. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and private (non-
FDI) capital flows are traditionally the most important private transactions together with 
official development assistance (ODA) coming from OECD/DAC members. Private non-FDI 
capital flows are highly volatile and cyclical and can on that count not be seen as a stable 
factor in development policy. FDI is a more stable factor but this is hardly a factor that will 
help countries with a poor social infrastructure (law and order, norms and values, health and 
education) and weak physical public infrastructure (roads, sewerage, electricity networks). 
Ideally, development assistance should in principle fill the gap where market failures appear.  
 
Official Development Assistance 
The practice of government intervention is however clouded by numerous problems which 
increase the transaction costs of correcting market failures. A study by Burnside and Dollar 
(2002) gives the impression that aid helps as long as it flows to countries with ‘good policy 
environments’. At present the number of studies which shed serious doubts about the 
effectiveness of foreign aid or multilateral loans are too large to ignore (cf. Barro and Lee, 
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2005; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; Easterly, 2003) and aid seems to be provided more in 
line with the ideology and preferences of donor governments than the needs of the least 
developed countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2001, Van Dalen, 2007). The collective action 
problems of foreign aid - primarily the counterproductive behavioral responses that are tied to 
the allocation funds and the organization of assistance - are fickle and the search for silver 
bullet solutions is bound to be misleading. Either complete decentralization or centralization 
of aid will run into trouble as both options have their specific transaction costs which make 
the choice between bilateral and multilateral aid or the choice of delivering aid through an 
NGO or a government department a pragmatic one (i.e. it depends on the costs and benefits of 
these institutions). One of the drawbacks of ODA or for that matter population assistance is its 
cyclicality: its tight connection with changes in GDP (IMF, 2005). 
 
Remittances 
Remittances are sometimes seen as a substitute for ODA. As one can see from Figure 6 
remittances from migrants have over time become a dominating flow of resources that tops 
ODA and that is almost at the same level as FDI. According to the World Bank (2004), 
remittances received by less developed countries totaled 93 billion US dollars in 2002. 
Although the size of remittance flows is undoubtedly large, evidence of their beneficial 
effects on development and economic growth is neither substantial nor unambiguous. In a 
comparative study of 74 less developed countries, Adams and Page (2003) found that 
remittances have a strong impact on reducing poverty. Similar findings are reported in IMF 
(2005) where remittances significantly reduce poverty and volatility in output, consumption 
and investment in the recipient countries. 
 
HERE FIGURE 6 
 
However, Chami et al. (2005), using panel data from 113 less developed countries, show that 
remittances have a negative effect on economic growth. These authors suggest that adverse 
effects on the behavior of those receiving remittances from migrants may be the key to 
understanding why this form of help hinders economic performance. The effects may be one 
or more of the following: to work less, save less, restrict efforts to find work, make riskier 
investments, and, perhaps, signal to other family members staying behind that it would be 
worthwhile to move abroad and join the remitter. Survey data in African countries (Schoorl et 
al. 2000) suggest that the allocation of remittances to productive investments is very small. 
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Most of the remittances are allocated to daily needs and in that respect one can understand 
why remittances offer assistance in poverty reduction but are less successful in generating 
growth and thereby a structural solution to poverty. Furthermore, there are signs noted by Van 
Dalen, Groenewold and Fokkema (2005) that remittances could potentially trigger new 
emigration flows either by financing emigration or by signaling to those staying behind that 
emigration is a profitable undertaking. 
 Furthermore, we should be wary of the fact that migrants stay mostly within their 
continent of birth (see Table 5) and remittances generally follow this trend (see Table 7). As 
one can see the remittances that go to Africa constitute 11 percent of the total amount of 91 
billion US dollars that annually crosses borders from migrants to their family and friends. The 
bulk of remittances goes to people living in Asian countries, but these money transfers also 
stem from migrants residing in Asian countries. 
 
HERE TABLE 7 
 
Some have proposed to use migration and the concomitant remittances as a way of 
development assistance. The numbers presented in Figure 6 reinforce the beliefs of those 
proponents. Such proposals can be best characterized as a sophisticated form of 
‘demographism’. The surplus population in developing countries can be used to smooth 
population aging in the developed world and by doing so remittances will flow to developing 
countries. An added bonus, so it is thought, is the fact that immigrants generate their own 
development aid by sending remittances home. Migration used in such an instrumental 
fashion negates the fact that migration is a free choice, albeit more and more bound by 
immigration policies restricting entrance. 
 
What might work: outsourcing to return migrants 
The development of offshore outsourcing of production and services may bring private capital 
flows and migration in line with each other. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages can, 
thanks to ICT-technology, become relevant at this point. This theory explains movement in 
goods and services in terms of the relative costs tied to producing these goods and services. A 
country exports goods in which it has relative cost advantage and imports those goods in 
which it has a relative cost disadvantage. However, in applying this theory one should keep in 
mind the realities of modern-day globalization in which proximity matters in carrying out 
transactions. The rhetoric of globalization revolves much about the image of a seamless world 
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and “the death of distance”. As Leamer and Storper (2001) argue, this image is in striking 
contrast with the empirical regularities reflected in geographical clustering in production: 
 
“The finer the division of labor, the greater are the coordination needs. Routine 
coordination of standardized intellectual or physical task can be done with 
‘markets’ that can be extended geographically with communication technologies. 
But complex and unfamiliar coordination of innovative activities requires long-
term relationships, closeness and agglomerations.”  (p. 643) 
 
In that respect, the alternative of offshore outsourcing may be an option which can comes 
midway as it offers the potential to make use of the wage differences in the world. Activities 
that can be outsourced to developing countries may initially be limited to standardized or 
easiliy codifiable tasks. But more complex services and products may become familiar to 
those countries through the return of migrants, who not only have human capital abroad but 
also social capital (i.e. trust and networks). It is thought that through this mechanism Sillicon 
Valley offered benefits to Indian immigrants who upon return in India could build ict services 
which benefit many western companies. Amiti and Wei (2005) show that the doomsday fears 
of developed nations (cf. Drezner, 2004) about the destructive power of service outsourcing 
are so far not justified. On the contrary, outsourcing is often accompanied by its counterpart – 
insourcing – and the new division of labor enabled by information and communication 
technology (ICT) is a profitable transaction for both sides. In short, migration and trade go 
hand in hand the intermediary role is recognized which migrants may play in bringing about 
long distance trade (cf. Gould, 1994) and the outsourcing of production and services 
(Helliwell, 2004). 
 
6. Which Way Out of the Population and Development Conundrum? 
Ever since Malthus published his Essay on Principles of Population it has been custom 
among outsiders to mark economists as dismal scientists. However, it may well be that the 
subject - demographic futures – is bound to make the commentators – be they demographers, 
sociologists or economists - the Cassandras the public so much laments. With hindsight 
Malthus’ blind spot was his neglect of technical progress. Perhaps current-day observers have 
become doomsayers who are impaired by the same blind spot and fail to see the possibilities 
of ICT-technology which may connect and solve the divergent needs of a demographically 
divided world. 
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In a globalizing world, no country is an island and the demographic developments outside 
a country can be just as important as the local developments. Population aging is a global 
phenomenon. However, the differences in speed of aging are of importance in economic 
development. Europe and Japan are the ‘leaders’ in terms of population aging. All other 
continents will follow but may not reach the levels of Europe and Japan the next few decades. 
African population aging will mainly occur after 2050. This set of circumstances can have 
substantial consequences for convergence of economic development. In this final section we 
will summarize the most prominent consequences of an aging world in relation to the question 
of economic convergence: 
 
• Demographic convergence does not necessarily imply economic convergence. 
Demographic factors offer a potential for catching up, whereby Africa and India can 
benefit from the demographic dividend implied by the demographic transition and the 
developed world can potentially experience the loss of this dividend. However, the 
demographic dividend offers only a growth potential. Whether these gains and losses are 
realized depends very much on the level capital accumulation, innovation and social 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the expected decline of fertility in the developing world may 
well be wishful projection. The interaction between fertility and human capital is a close 
one and in predicting the future course of fertility understanding this nexus better is of 
importance as it could destroy the supposed convergence of demographic developments. 
• Migration offers no structural solution to aging populations in the North nor to a 
reduction of poverty in the South. To stop the population aging process countries would 
need excessively high levels of immigration which will in due time make integration of 
immigrants difficult and also increase the population density in host countries 
substantially. Migration can at most dampen the transitional effects of aging. Of course, 
this view and conclusion are mainly based on taking a purely demographic stand. Does an 
economic viewpoint help? Migration has been seen by some as the solution to many 
problems. Movement of human capital is in this view a substitute for the movement of 
physical capital and by the same logic of capital movements, reaping the benefits of 
diverging returns on investment, so can labor movement reap the benefits of diverging 
wages. However, the circumstances under which everyone - the country of destination and 
source and the migrant himself or herself - will benefit from migration are rare (Galor, 
1986). Much depends on initial circumstances in both the source and destination country. 
Furthermore, migration generates multifaceted problems and opportunities that transcend 
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the simple economics of migration because it involves the movement of persons who have 
their own norms and values. Adapting to new circumstances is a difficult and long-lasting 
process, which could take many generations (Borjas, 1999). Furthermore, the 
consequences of ethnic heterogeneity can be large. Ethnic heterogeneity plays a role at 
two levels: migration and economic growth. Immigration is often seen as the silver bullet 
for aging countries, but in the process advocates have forgotten how ethnic diversity can 
hamper integration of immigrants. Furthermore, ethnic diversity is pinpointed by some 
(see, e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997) as the prime reason why Africa’s economic growth 
record is so poor. Ethnic diversity makes cooperation more difficult and in turn leads to 
worse policies. However, the final verdict on the pros and cons of ethnic diversity has still 
to be given as there are also hopeful signs that a culture of diversity can promote growth 
but so far it is only theory and not practice (cf. Alesina and Le Ferrara, 2005). 
• Global collective action is wound up in problems of its own design. The catching up in 
‘emigration’ countries or regions is of interest to both destination and source countries. A 
convergence of economic development is not within reach for a number of decades as the 
less developed countries lack the social infrastructure to prosper and catch up with OECD 
countries. One cannot expect capital to flow from rich countries to poor countries as long 
as the real engines of growth are not in place (cf. Lucas, 1990). To attain this process one 
cannot put one’s sole hope on remittances as these are not primarily used for the finance 
of public goods on a national scale. Official Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI may 
offer more hope in principle. ODA has, however, in the recent past not proven to be the 
silver bullet for developing countries. As Easterly remarks: “There is no Next Big Idea 
that will make the small amount of foreign aid the catalyst for economic growth of the 
world’s poor nations.” (2003: 40). The organization of global collective action needs to be 
taken seriously (see Sandler, 2004). Foreign aid is at the moment tangled up with too 
many moral hazard problems to make it a credible long-run solution. At the same time one 
has to realize that one has to act in order to alleviate pressing problems of hunger and the 
destructive forces of nature and man (terrorism, global warming). Perhaps, the most 
sustainable solution is to offer capital flows in which the developed world participates 
directly in the interests of the developing world, in other words besides investing in 
private ventures there should also be financial participation in public goods. 
 
These perspectives leave us with the conundrum of population and development. Are there no 
stones left unturned? The pressure of migration to the EU and US from neighboring regions 
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can be expected to increase substantially. Remittances, FDI and ODA will remain necessary 
for the near future, but only FDI together with a breakdown of trade barriers can offer a 
sustainable world economy in the long run. It is always tempting to conjure up a solution 
which merges the best of all possible worlds, but such solutions will generally defy the harsh 
fact that free lunches for resolving such fundamental differences are not widespread. Lately, 
migration is seen as as the silver bullet solution because it not only smooths population 
decline but the remittances sent back home by far surpass the amounts which OECD/DAC 
members generate in terms of Official Development Assistance. Undoubtedly remittances 
have their beneficial effects on the welfare of people as they offer some insurance against 
poverty, but it is too early to say that remittances (and thereby migration) offers a superior 
means of offering development assistance. Remittances flow to a selective group of families 
and one can question the benefits that flow from remittances for the population at large as the 
allocation of these funds flow more to consumption than to investment purposes (cf. Chami et 
al. 2005). The key to sustained growth and convergence in economic development in the end 
have to be found in the private hands of citizens themselves. Development aid can at best help 
some poor people some of the time. The global collective action problems are too complex 
and the willingness to contribute too unbalanced to become effective.  
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Figure 1: Change in Life expectancy, 1950-2050 
 
Source: UN (2004) projections 
 
Figure 2: Total fertility in  main regions of the world, 1950-2050 
 
 
Source: UN (2004) projections 
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Figure 3: Working-age population (15-64 age group as percentage of total) in 
international perspective 
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Source: UN (2004) projections 
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Figure 4: The median age of populations in the world, 1950-2050 
 
Source: UN (2004) projections 
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Figure 5: Development of primary funds on population assistance programs, 1970-2005 
(million US dollars) 
 
 
 
Source: Van Dalen and Reuser (2005) 
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Figure 6: Workers’ Remittances and Other Capital Flows to Developing Countries, 
1970-2003 (in billion US dollars) 
 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2005, p. 70). 
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Table 1: Proportions of Demand Satisfied by Modern Contraceptive Use by Wealth 
Quintile (Q1 poorest, Q5 wealthiest), unweighted averages for selected countries within 
region 
 Period Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All quintiles 
Africa 1990-1995 12.9 16.0 17.7 24.7 36.9 22.9 
 1996-2000 23.7 25.2 29.1 37.2 48.0 33.9 
Latin America 1990-1995 29.4 40.7 49.0 57.4 65.3 50.0 
 1996-2000 38.1 48.8 57.3 61.7 68.0 56.4 
Asia 1990-1995 48.2 51.0 57.5 57.5 67.6 57.1 
 1996-2000 50.0 57.1 59.8 63.7 70.7 60.9 
N. Africa/W Asia 1990-1995 36.8 45.7 53.7 58.2 65.4 53.8 
 1996-2000 49.7 59.0 62.0 67.5 70.5 62.7 
Global average 1990-1995 29.2 35.8 40.4 46.2 55.6 42.7 
 1996-2000 37.9 44.4 49.3 54.7 62.1 50.8 
Source: Bernstein (2004), cited in Ross et al. (2005: 52). 
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Table 2: Explaining the number of children among ever married womena 
 
 Non-
OECD 
EU15 New EU 
members 
EU 
candidate 
members 
OECD 
members 
outside EU
Age group (15-29 = 0)      
   30-49 1.19 
(0.03) 
0.95 
(0.06) 
0.80 
(0.06) 
1.21 
(0.07) 
1.13  
(0.07) 
   50 and older 1.77 
(0.03) 
1.30 
(0.06) 
0.83 
(0.07) 
1.34 
(0.08) 
1.66  
(0.07) 
Marital status (married/living 
together = 0) 
     
   Divorced/separated -0.39 
(0.04) 
-0.21 
(0.05) 
-0.22 
(0.06) 
-0.57 
(0.13) 
-0.24 
(0.07) 
   Widowed -0.14 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.14 
(0.08) 
0.33 
(0.08) 
Education (lower = 0)      
   Middle -0.67 
(0.02) 
-0.26 
(0.04) 
-0.35 
(0.04) 
-0.78 
(0.06) 
-0.45 
(0.06) 
   Upper -1.01 
(0.03) 
-0.37 
(0.05) 
-0.49 
(0.06) 
-1.03 
(0.09) 
-0.60 
(0.07) 
Income (lower = 0)      
   Middle -0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.18 
(0.06) 
-0.20 
(0.05) 
   Upper -0.11 
(0.03) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.24 
(0.08) 
-0.26 
(0.06) 
Importance of religion in your life 
(very important = 0): 
     
  Rather important   -0.12 
(0.03) 
-0.16 
(0.04) 
-0.17 
(0.05) 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
-0.23 
(0.06) 
  Not very important -0.19 
(0.04) 
-0.25 
(0.05) 
-0.13 
(0.06) 
-0.20 
(0.10) 
-0.38 
(0.06) 
  Not at all important -0.16 
(0.05) 
-0.34 
(0.05) 
-0.14 
(0.06) 
-0.26 
(0.13) 
-0.49 
(0.08) 
Constant 1.84 
(0.06) 
1.85 
(0.11) 
2.19 
(0.10) 
1.71 
(0.11) 
2.29  
(0.12) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N = 21,256 6,749 3,556 2,996 4,130 
Adj. R2 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.28 0.25 
(a) Standard errors are stated within brackets. Source data: World Values Survey, 2000-2001 
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Table 3: Absolute change in world population by main age groups, (in millions) over 25 
year periods 
 Absolute change in world population for time period: 
 1950-1975 1975-2000 2000-2025 2025-2050 
Total 1,554 2,012 1,820 1,171 
Age structure of this change 
Age group 
0-14 40.8 16.4 4.5 -6.5 
15-24 19.2 15.6 7.7 1.2 
25-64 33.6 58.6 65.3 51.3 
65-74 4.2 5.5 13.6 22.3 
75+ 2.3 3.9 8.9 31.8 
 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: UN (2004) projections 
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Table 4: GDP per capita in the world and major regions, 1500-2001 (in 1990 
international dollars) 
 
 1500 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 2001 
Western Europe 771 1204 1960 3458 4579 11416 19256 
US, Canada, Australia en New Zealand 400 1202 2419 5233 9268 16179 26943 
Japan 500 669 737 1387 1921 11434 20683 
West 702 1109 1882 3672 5649 13082 22509 
Asia (excl. Japan)  572 577 550 658 634 1226 3256 
Latin America 416 692 681 1481 2506 4504 5811 
Eastern Europe and Russia 498 686 941 1558 2602 5731 5038 
Africa 414 420 500 637 894 1410 1489 
Rest 538 578 606 860 1091 2072 3377 
World 566 667 875 1525 2111 4091 6049 
        
Ratio West/Africa 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.8 6.3 9.3 15.1 
Ratio West/Rest 1.3 1.9 3.1 4.3 5.2 6.3 6.7 
 
Source: Maddison (2005: 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Pattern of migration flows in the world (in million persons), 2000 
 Migrants coming from:  
Going to: Africa Asia Europe Latin America* North America Oceania Total 
Africa 11.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 
Asia 2.0 34.9 3.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 40.8 
Europe 2.3 4.1 34.9 0.4 0.4 0.1 42.1 
Latin America* 0.0 0.1 1.7 2.9 0.4 0.0 5.2 
North America 0.7 8.3 6.2 14.7 1.0 0.1 31.0 
Oceania 0.3 1.5 2.7 0.0 0.2 0.7 5.3 
Total 16.8 49.3 48.9 18.3 2.3 1.0 136.7 
 
* Latin America includes the Caribbean 
Source: Harrison (2004) 
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Table 6: Primary funds to population and AIDS activities from international 
foundations, 1996-2007 
 
 General 
unearmarked 
contributions 
Earmarked funds flowing to: Total Funds 
Year  Family 
Planning 
Reproductive 
Health 
STD/HIV/AIDS Basic Research  
 Allocation across categories in percentages Million US $ 
1996 23.0 8.2 26.3 10.7 31.8 1,369.1 
1997 26.3 10.1 22.1 11.3 30.3 1,529.9 
1998 10.2 15.9 37.9 12.2 23.8 1,538.8 
1999 35.5 10.3 36.1 9.1 8.9 1,411.1 
2000 1.8 11.3 48.0 33.2 5.7 1,597.7 
2001 7.2 7.1 48.3 33.9 3.5 1,719.7 
2002 8.0 7.3 18.6 56.3 9.8 2,313.9 
2003 8.6 9.7 28.9 45.0 7.7 3,737.7 
2004 23.1 7.1 14.7 49.1 5.9 5,578.4 
2005* 6.1 2.5 7.6 80.3 3.5 5,818.0 
2006* 6.0 2.2 7.1 81.6 3.1 6,659.3 
2007* 5.4 1.7 5.9 84.8 2.2 7,421.6 
* Projections 
Source: NIDI/UNFPA/UNAIDS 
 
 
Table 7: Pattern of remittance flows in the world (in billion US dollars), 2000 
 Remittances going to  
Coming from: Africa Asia Europe Latin America North America Oceania Total 
Africa 3.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 
Asia 3.4 31.5 3.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 39.0 
Europe 2.6 3.2 9.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 16.2 
Latin America  0.0 0.1 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.8 
North America 0.7 7.9 5.7 14.2 0.9 0.1 29.6 
Oceania 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Total 10.4 43.4 19.6 16.2 1.6 0.3 91.5 
* This table excludes $24.1 billion for European border workers. 
Source: Harrison (2004) 
